California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra: The State of California Has Determined that Pregnancy may be Hazardous to your Job by Berman, Susan Spalter
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 3 Women's Law Forum Article 4
January 1986
California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra: The State of California Has Determined
that Pregnancy may be Hazardous to your Job
Susan Spalter Berman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan Spalter Berman, California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra: The State of California Has Determined that Pregnancy
may be Hazardous to your Job, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1986).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/4
NOTES 
CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION V. GUERRA: 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
HAS DETERMINED THAT PREGNANCY 
MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR JOB 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 
Guerra, l the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the facial validity of California Government Code 
section 12945(b)(2).2 The court vehemently rejected a federal 
preemption argumentS and held that a law setting a minimum 
1. Cal. Fed: Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Fergu-
son, J; Pregerson, J; Gilliam, J. sitting by designation), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3460 
(U.S. Jan. 14, 1986) (No. 85-494). 
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). Section 12945(b)(2) provides that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification: 
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions ... : 
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasona-
ble period of time; provided, such period shall not exceed four 
months. Such employee shall be entitled to utilize any accrued 
vacation leave during this period of time. Reasonable period of 
time means that period during which the female employee is 
disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions. 
ld. See infra note 71 for discussion of the significance of the law's specific application to 
medical disabilities of pregnancy. 
3. The employer argued that the state law was preempted because it created a dis-
parity between the number of total disability leave days allowed for female and male 
employees in job settings where medical disability leaves were not available at all or were 
not available for as long as four months or where guaranteed reinstatement was not 
available as California required in its application of the state law. Brief of Appellees at 5, 
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d 390. The employer further claimed that federal 
515 
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leave for pregnancy disabilities did not, on its face, discriminate 
against men or conflict with the purpose of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19644 as amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act (PDA).!> 
The issue of whether the PDA allows any different treat-
ment for pregnancy has divided the feminist community.6 All 
agree that the PDA prevents employers from treating pregnant 
employees less favorably than other temporarily disabled em-
ployees. The disputed question, however, is whether or not the 
PDA allows employers to treat pregnant employees more favora-
bly than other temporarily disabled employees. Supporters of 
the California law claim favorable treatment is necessary to ne-
gate the harsh impact childbearing places on women when em-
ployers fail to provide sick leave which is adequate for either 
recovery from normal childbirth7 or for common medical compli-
law forbids any differential treatment of employees based on pregnancy. Id. at 8. 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1981). Section 2000e-2(a) on employer practices provides: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). See infra note 19 for relevant language. 
6. See Curtis, For Equality of the Sexes, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, June 1985, at 15 (gen-
eral discussion of controversy). The controversy has sparked a debate among feminist 
lawyers. See also Kreiger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controuersy: Equal Treatment, 
Positiue Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE UL. REV. 513 
(1983) (detailed discussion of both the controversy and the varying theoretical models of 
sexual equality underlying the controverted positions). Miller-Wohl is a case that 
presented the same preemption issue as Cal. Fed. Sau. & Loan Ass'n in a challenge to a 
Montana law which mandated pregnancy disability leaves in that state. Miller-
Wohl Co. v. Mont. Comm'r of Labor and Indus., _ Mont. -. 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 
1984), appeal filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3718 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985). See also Williams, The 
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
L. REP. 175 (1981-82) (discussion supporting the "same treatment" or "equal treatment" 
approach). But see Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, 94 YALE LJ. 929 (1985) (advocating different treatment to accommodate 
pregnancy). ' 
7. Representatives of the medical community report that "the usual period of disa-
2
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cations of pregnancy.8 Those who oppose the state law insist 
that the PDA compels employers to treat pregnant employees 
absolutely the same as other temporarily disabled employees.9 
Taking that position, the National Organization for Women 
(NOW), the National Women's Political Caucus, the League of 
Women Voters, and others, filed an amicus brief supporting the 
saving and loan'siO argument for preemption.ll In sharp con-
trast, California Women Lawyers and Equal Rights AdvocatesI2 
filed an amicus brief supporting appellant Guerra'siS (the 
bility after birth is six to eight weeks. Thus, a disability claim of up to 12 weeks for a 
normal pregnancy would be reasonable." S. !{AMERMAN, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORK-
ING WOMEN 44-45 (1980) (emphasis in original) cited in Brief of Appellees at 36, Cal. 
Fed. Sou. & Loan Ass'n. 
8. Some of the medical complications of pregnancy are toxemia, marked by high 
blood pressure and other symptoms, occurring to some degree in five to ten percent of 
pregnant women; placenta praevia, caused by low implantation of the placenta, occurring 
in approximately one in 500 pregnancies; and abruptio placentae, pre-birth separation of 
the placenta, occurring in approximately one in 100 pregnancies. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRIT-
TANICA, MACROPAEDIA 14, at 981-82 (15th ed. 1975). Any multiple birth also significantly 
complicates pregnancy. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 529 (15th 
ed. 1976). Approximately 12.2 births in 1000 are twin and bed rest is sometimes recom-
mended as a method of increasing fetal growth in women carrying multiple fetuses. Id. at 
531,545. 
9. Under this view, the minimum disability leave available to pregnant employees 
under the PDA is also the maximum. The length of the leave cannot exceed that which is 
available to disabled male employees. 
10. California Federal Savings and Loan Association, a federally chartered savings 
and loan association, was joined in its complaint by plaintiff Merchants and Manufactur-
ers Association, a non-profit California corporation which is a trade association repre-
senting employers, and plaintiff California Chamber of Commerce, a non-profit Califor-
nia corporation which represents business entities throughout the state including 
California Federal Savings and Loan Association. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief at 3, Cal. Fed. Sau. & Loan Ass'n. 
11. The pro-preemption amici claimed that the PDA prohibited any difference in 
treatment of employees based on pregnancy. They argued that any sex-based distinction, 
even well intended, had the effect of limiting women's role in the workplace. Brief for 
Amici Curiae at 5, Cal. Fed. Sau. & Loan Ass'n. However, they markedly differed from 
the employer, whose interpretation of the PDA they supported, in urging the court to 
construe section 12945(b)(2) as requiring employers to provide up to four months of dis-
ability leave to employees of both sexes as an effective cure to any fatal sex-based dis-
tinction within the law. Id. at 43. See generally BABCOCK, FREEMAN, NORTON & Ross, SEX 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 19-53, 268-72 (1975) (how protective legislation has im-
pacted on women in the workplace). 
12. Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. is a San Francisco-based public interest law firm 
engaged in women's advocacy and specializing in the area of sex discrimination. This 
firm argued that the California law was consistent with the legislative intent behind pas-
sage of the PDA which was to prevent working women who are also childbearers from 
being denied equal employment opportunities. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 5, Cal. Fed. 
Sau. & Loan Ass'n. 
13. Mark Guerra is the State of California's Director of the Department of Fair Em-
3
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state's) contention that section 12945(b)(2) was not inconsistent 
with Title VII and that states could lawfully mandate leaves to 
prevent pregnant workers from being fired as a consequence of 
the inadequate sick leave policies of employers, whether or not 
similar disability leaves were available to other employees.I4 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. FEDERAL LAW 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful to 
discriminate in employment on the basis of sex.It> However, in 
1976 the Supreme Court held in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bertI6 that an otherwise comprehensive benefit plan which ex-
cluded pregnancy coverage was not unlawful sex discrimination 
under Title VII.I7 Outraged by the Court's conclusion that dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination on 
the basis of sex although only women get pregnant, Congress re-
sponded with the enactment of the PDA 18 which unequivocally 
defined discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as sex 
discrimination.I9 
ployment and Housing. Also named as defendants were Cruz F. Sandoval, as Chair Com-
missioner of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission, and the Fair Employment 
and Housing Commission of the State of California. 
14. Under this view, the PDA defines only the minimum disability leave available to 
pregnant employees. They must be treated at least as well as male workers who become 
temporarily disabled; however, a greater benefit is permissible to mitigate the burden 
childbearing places only on female workers. 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1981). 
16. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
17. Id. at 133-40 (excluding pregnancy from otherwise inclusive employee insurance 
plans held not to violate Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex 
because the differentiation was between pregnant and non-pregnant employees with the 
latter group comprised of women as ooowell as men). 
18. See S. Rep. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 
2nd Sess. (1978). 
Id. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). It provides; 
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-re-
lated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe bene-
fit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-
2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. 
4
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The only Supreme Court case interpreting the PDA is N ew-
port News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC.20 There, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission21 cited the em-
ployer for failing to provide maternity health benefits to spouses 
of male employees that were equal to the maternity health bene-
fits provided to female employees. The Court held that giving a 
less complete benefit package to male workers was discrimina-
tion against men on the basis of sex and that the greater cost of 
providing comparable maternity benefits for spouses of male em-
ployees did not justify the inequity in coverage.22 The test of 
whether the employment benefits given to male and female em-
ployees by an employer were equal was not a comparison of the 
number of dollars spent on employees of each sex but rather a 
comparison of the comprehensiveness of the benefit package 
provided for employees of each sex.23 
B. STATE LAW 
California responded to the Gilbert decision by passing 
Government Code section 12945(b)(2)24 requiring employers 
subject to Title VIp5 to provide a reasonable leave of up to four 
months to employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated conditions. As construed by the state,26 the law requires 
employers to reinstate such workers to the same or a similar po-
sition unless the employer can show a business necessity which 
reasonably justifies noncompliance.27 However, the law does not 
20. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See Note, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 663 (Summer 1984). 
21. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for enforcement 
of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1981). 
22. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676-85. 
23.Id. 
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1982). Assembly Bill 1960 (1977-78 Reg. 
Sess.) created a statute which preceded Government Code section 12945(b)(2) and was 
intended to protect all pregnant employees from inadequate leave policies. Such protec-
tion was formerly only available to employees of school districts. Cal. SummBry Digest at 
374. 
25. Government Code section 12945(e) makes section 12945(b)(2) applicable to em-
ployers such as Cal Fed that are subject to Title VII. "The provisions of this section, 
except paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), shall be inapplicable to any employer subject to 
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964." CAL. Gov. CODE § 12945(e) (West 1982) 
(emphasis added). Title VII applies to employers who have 15 or more employees and 
who are engaged in interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·(b) (1981). 
26. The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, an appellant in 
the instant case, interpreted and enforced this law for the state. See supra note 13. 
27. Opening Brief of State Appellants at 7, Cal. Fed. Sao. & Loan Ass'n. 
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require paid leaves for pregnant employees greater than those 
available to other disabled employees.2s Moreover, pregnant 
workers are not automatically entitled to the maximum four 
month leave because employers affected by the law are only re-
quired to provide that leave which pregnant employees medi-
cally require up to a maximum of four months.29 
C. FACTS OF CASE 
In 1982 Lillian Garland,30 a receptionist/PBX operator em-
ployed by California Federal Savings and Loan Association (Cal 
Fed), took a four month maternity leave. In spite of her request 
to return to work at the end of the leave, Cal Fed did not rein-
state her for an additional seven months.31 When California's 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing served a com-
plaint· on Cal Fed alleging a violation of section 12945(b)(2),a2 
Cal Fed filed a suit for declaratory relief claiming that Title VII 
preempted the law because the California statute required dif-
ferent treatment of male and female employees on the basis of 
pregnancy.33 On cross-motions for summary judgment, Cal Fed 
prevailed. The district court held that Title VII preempted the 
California law because it discriminated against males on the ba-
sis of pregnancy.34 The state appealed the ruling to the United 
28. Questions and Answers on Pregnancy, California's Dep't of Fair Empl. and 
Hous., Question 23. 
29. ld. at Question 1. 
30. The'district court denied Garland's motion to intervene as a defendant. She ap-
pealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit which found that the issues raised by her ap-
peal did not go to the merits of the case. These issues were addressed in a separate, 
unpublished memorandum. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan ,Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393. 
31. Cal Fed's leave policy was gender-neutral on its face but did not guarantee rein-
statement of employees on pregnancy disability leave to the same or a similar position as 
required under the state's interpretation of section 12945(b)(2). Opening Brief of State 
Appellants at 4, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. Under its policy, "Cal Fed reserve[d] the 
right to terminate an employee on leave of absence if a similar and suitable position 
[was] not available ...• " Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 392 n.4. 
32. California interprets the leave requirement as, by inference, creating a presump-
tion of reinstatement to the same or a similar position at the end of the leave period, 
unless not doing so is justified by business necessity. Brief of Appellees at 5, Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 
33. Because Cal Fed did not guarantee reinstatement to other temporarily disabled 
employees, the state law compelled the employer to treat employees disabled by preg-
nancy differently than other temporarily disabled employees. 
34. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393. 
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.35 
III. THE COURT'S REASONING 
To determine whether California Government Code section 
12945(b)(2) was preempted by Title VII as amended by the 
PDA, the Ninth Circuit first explored the scope of Title VII pre-
emption. The court looked to Title VII's own preemption provi-
sions36 and found that the plain language of Title VII37 did not 
preclude additional state anti-discrimination laws unless they 
were inconsistent with any of the purposes of Title VII.3s It con-
cluded, therefore, that the scope of Title VII preemption was 
very narrow and that state law was only preempted when it pro-
moted an employment practice which was inconsistent with Ti-
tle VII's goal of equality in employment opportunity.39 . 
The court thus had to determine whether the state statute 
was detrimental to that goal. Here the court avoided a broad 
35. [d. at 392. 
36. Title VII's preemption provisions state: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or re-
lieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punish-
ment provided by any present or future law of any State or 
political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which 
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which 
would be an unlawful employment practice under this 
subchapter. 
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-7 (1981) (emphasis supplied by Ninth Circuit); 
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed 
as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the 
field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State 
laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of 
this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State 
law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the pur-
poses of this Act, or any provision thereof. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1981) (emphasis supplied by Ninth Circuit). 
37. The court looked to the plain language and legislative history of Title VII using 
the approach followed by the Supreme Court in determining whether the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted state disability law in Shaw v. Delta 
Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1983). The Supreme Court noted in Shaw that "Title VII 
does not itself prevent States from extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not 
covered by Title VII ..•. n [d. at 103. 
38. Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994, 998 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (purpose of preemp-
tion provisions of Title VII was to preserve state anti-discrimination laws but eradicate 
inconsistent laws). 
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (Title VII enacted to further 
equality in employment opportunities). 
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ruling either on whether Title VII itself mandated adequate 
pregnancy disability leaves40 or whether section 12945(b)(2) 
might be discriminatory as applied in some factual settings.41 
The court decided only the permissibility of the state action in 
light of Title VII as amended by the PDA.42 Citing recent Su-
preme Court decisions that recognized the authority of states to 
freely legislate in non-preempted areas without any substitution 
by the judiciary of its judgment for that of elected lawmakers,43 
the court also avoided an inquiry into whether extant leave poli-
cies actually justified the state action. It decided only the facial 
validity of section 12945(b)(2). 
Before turning its focus to the effect of the PDA on employ-
ment discrimination law,44 the Ninth Circuit first distinguished 
pregnancy disability from unlawful employment classifications 
which are based on sex stereotypes45 and not actual biological 
differences.46 
The court then recognized the history of the PDA as a con-
gressional response to the Supreme Court's failure in General 
40. The state urged this position. Opening Brief of State Appellants at 21, Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n (inadequate leave policy is a prima facie violation of Title VII). 
41. Cal Fed urged this position. Brief of Appellees at 30, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n (California law requires a four month pregnancy disability leave when the em-
ployer does not provide a four month disability leave for other medical conditions). See 
supra note 3 for discussion of Cal Fed's argument. 
42. This was the narrow issue raised by the district court's conclusion that section 
12945(b)(2) was impermissible as a matter of law on cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 394. "We need not determine, as the 
litigants would have us do, whether Title VII compels employers to grant reasonable 
pregnancy disability leave to protect women from the potentially disparate impact of 
facially neutral, but inadequate, disability leave policies; we need only decide whether 
section 12945(b)(2) is permissible under Title VII."· Id. 
43. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1015 (1985) 
(city transit system not exempt from federal wage regulations); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-31 (1984) (where a state found a substantial reason for 
exercising its power to pass a law redistributing ownership in land, courts should defer to 
the judgment of the state legislature). 
44. This was the issue at the heart of the feminist controversy. 
45. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977) (archaic stereotyped assump-
tions such as viewing women and not men as dependent spouses cannot be used to jus-
tify dissimilar treatment of women and men). 
46. The Ninth Circuit noted, "[B]ecause section 12945(b)(2) deals with a condition 
that is unique to women-pregnancy disability rather than, say, parenting-our decision 
has no bearing on the lawfulness of state statutes or employment practices that classify 
on the basis of purportedly sex-linked factors that are actually less biological than stere-
otypical." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 395. 
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Electric Co. v. Gilbert47 to require employers to provide preg-
nancy benefits in otherwise complete healthcare packages. It 
concluded that while the language of the PDA is ambiguous as 
to whether any distinction based on pregnancy is permissible,48 
the PDA was intended to adopt the Gilbert dissent49 which did 
allow the recognition of pregnancy in employment policies.lIo 
The court also relied on Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry 
Dock Co. v. EEOClil to determine whether equality of treatment 
compelled employers to give the same total number of disability 
leave days to both men and women. In Newport News, the Su-
preme Court explained that the cost of the employee's benefit 
package was not the appropriate measure of equality.1I2 Rather, 
it was necessary to look at the comprehensiveness of the benefit 
coverage offered to both sexes to see if equal treatment was 
achieved. 53 In Newport News, although it cost more for employ-
ers to provide wives of male employees with the same health 
benefits available to female employees, the additional cost of the 
male benefit package was a necessary means of achieving equally 
complete benefits for employees of both sexes. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, by analogy, concluded that the number of disability leave 
days offered by the employer, like the number of dollars spent 
by the employer, was not the appropriate measure of equality of 
employment opportunity. Looking instead to the completeness 
of the benefit offered to employees of both sexes, the court 
found that offering pregnancy leaves only to female workers did 
not deprive the male employees of a benefit that they too re-
quired.54 Since men do not get pregnant, the court reasoned that 
47. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
48. The court recognized "a tension between the PDA's first clause, which subjects 
pregnancy to the same types of discrimination analysis to which it subjects sex, and its 
second clause, which appears to demand pregnancy-neutral policies at all times." Id. at 
396. See supra note 19 for relevant language. 
49. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 159. "A realistic understanding of conditions found in today's labor envi-
ronment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning disability policies." Id. 
5!. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See supra notes 20, 22-23 and accompanying text. 
52. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685 n.26. See Note, Sexual Equality Under the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 690, 711-12 (1983) (differential in 
amount spent on benefits to male and female employees supported by legislative history 
of PDA). 
53. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676 (comparison of the comprehensiveness of protec-
tion afforded to female and male employees is proper test of discrimination). 
54. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "equality under the PDA must be measured 
in employment opportunity, not necessarily in amounts of money expended-or amounts 
9
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denying them pregnancy leaves did not result in a less complete 
benefit package and thus did not discriminate against men. 55 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the state law was not pre-
empted because it did not on its face promote an illegal employ-
ment practice inconsistent with Title VII.56 
The court concluded that requiring the law to be totally 
blind to pregnancy made no sense. 57 It determined that because 
Title VII protects employees from sexual discrimination result-
ing from the disparate impact of facially neutral employment 
policies,58 employees must be afforded the same protection from 
pregnancy discrimination which was incorporated into Title VII 
by the PDA. Thus the state could act prophylactically to pre-
vent the disparate impact of facially neutral but inadequate dis-
ability leave policies on pregnant workers.59 
IV. CRITIQUE 
In rejecting the district court's holding that a state law 
guaranteeing minimal pregnancy disability leaves discriminated 
against men, the Ninth Circuit admonished the lower court for 
reaching a conclusion that defied common sense.so Fortunately, 
of days of disability leave expended. Equality in the disability context compares coverage 
to actual need, not coverage to hypothetical identical needs." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 396. 
55. The Ninth Circuit explained that because male employees do not get pregnant, 
failing to give them pregnancy disability leaves causes their total disability package to 
suffer "no consequent diminution." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393. 
56. Id. at 396. 
57. The court explained that "[a]ttributing to Congress an intent that employers or 
states must ignore pregnancy completely when fashioning their disability policies would 
be as absurd as discovering a congressional intent that states or employers must com-
pletely ignore prostatitis on pain of violating Title VII." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
758 F.2d at 395. 
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Some statistical showing of 
a disparate impact is used,to prove Title VII discrimination under a disparate impact 
analysis. See, e.g., id. at 430 n.6. However, in Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, where a state 
law was challenged, the court determined that the state could act under Title VII to 
prevent a disparate impact. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 396. Thus the court 
avoided determining whether there was any actual discriminatory impact on pregnant 
employees. See infra note 70 for further discussion of disparate impact. 
59. The court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case with 
instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the state. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 397. 
60. The court began its analysis by holding "that the district court's conclusion that 
section 12945(b)(2) discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common 
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rational thinking prevailed in the Ninth Circuit opinion. The 
Ninth Circuit appropriately applied analogous case law, but also 
displayed a healthy reliance on common sense for its crucial in-
terpretation of the PDA where guidance was limited. 
The court confronted the fact that blindly requiring the 
same treatment for female and male employees in every situa-
tion leads to an intuitively incorrect result when, as here, a dis-
tinction is made based on an inherent sexual difference.61 De-
priving women of a benefit necessary for them to achieve 
employment equality essentially because men don't happen to 
need it is illogical as well as unjust.62 That result reveals the flaw 
in an inflexible interpretation of the PDA.63 Rather than offering 
women employment equality, such an interpretation subtly un-
dermines it by perpetuating the use of male needs as the deter-
minant of women's benefits.64 
The court adopted a more humanistic approach.6!) Newport 
sense, misinterprets case law and flouts Title VII and the PDA." Cal. Fed. Sao. & Loan 
Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393. 
61. The ability to become pregnant is a biological, female characteristic in contrast 
to a sexual stereotype such as attributing to women a superior ability to parent. See 
supra note 46 for Ninth Circuit's discussion of the distinction. 
62. See Kreiger & Cooney, supra note 6, at 544-57, who discuss the flaws in the 
"same treatment" model of equality. That model causes inequitable results not only be-
cause it is based on the erroneous assumption that the sexes are the same, but also be-
cause men provide the normative standard by which both men and women are measured. 
[d. at 545. The authors stress the need to focus on equality in effect rather than equality 
in treatment. [d. at 557. 
63. The flaw will become more dramatic if there is a revival of anti-abortion laws. In 
that event, women who become pregnant will be compelled to bear a child, yet states will 
be unable to pass laws to safeguard their jobs when they become temporarily disabled by 
the birth. 
64. This results from adherence to a rigid model of equality which cannot take into 
account the most basic sexual difference, pregnancy. If the PDA requires employers to 
give women only those benefits that male workers get, women are wrongly hindered by 
benefits that reflect the demands of an anachronistic, male·dominated workforce. 
Realistically, employers such as Cal Fed resist any expansion of benefits that in-
crease their cost of doing business. Note, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the instant suit 
was brought by employers asserting their own interests and not by male employees. Cal. 
Fed. Sao. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393 n.6. If the Supreme Court finds the state statute 
preempted as a matter of law, employers will then use the rigidity of the PDA to avoid 
any additional expenditure to accommodate childbirth. If Cal Fed is any example, em-
ployers will not voluntarily expand benefits to employees of both sexes to accommodate 
female employees without creating differences in treatment. They will strongly oppose 
future legislation that mandates such broad expansion and claim that it makes the cost 
of doing business unnecessarily high. 
65. The court concluded that by enacting the PDA "Congress intended to reverse 
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News, although a different factual setting, compels a comparison 
of the ultimate effects of employment benefits or practices on 
employees to determine whether men and women are being 
treated equally.66 The controlling factor is not the cost to the 
employer but the impact on the employees.67 In Newport News, 
both male and female employees who had children had to meet 
the medical expenses of childbirth, so the issue as to whether an 
employee or the spouse of an employee literally bore the child 
was irrelevant. Therefore, employees of both sexes shared the 
same need and had to be treated alike. In contrast, pregnancy 
disability leave is only necessary for the employee actually giv-
ing birth, who will always be a woman. Since only women can 
become pregnant, mandating pregnancy disability leaves does 
not discriminate against men because men are not being de-
prived of a benefit they need.68 That result makes sense.69 
Gilbert, to require employers to include pregnancy disability leave in their otherwise 
comprehensive benefit packages, and thus to construct a floor beneath which pregnancy 
disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise." Id. at 
396. Although the court did not mention Williams, supra note 6, at 196, this language 
seems to be a direct response to her "same treatment" argument that "[t)he equality 
approach to pregnancy (such as that embodied in the PDA) necessarily creates not only 
the desired floor under the pregnant woman's rights but also the ceiling .... " Id. The 
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the proposition that the benefit floor must also be the ceil-
ing. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 396. 
In a more recent article defending the "same treatment" model of equality, Williams 
agreed that disparate impact analysis should be available to prove pregnancy discrimina-
tion as it is to prove other kinds of Title VII discrimination. Williams, Equality's Riddle: 
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.D. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985). However, she argued that because the PDA proscribes laws that 
make any distinction based on pregnancy, a state cannot pass a law such as section 
12945(b)(2) to prevent the possible disparate impact on pregnant women of neutral leave 
policies. Id. at 348, 368. Rather, a female employee can only make use of disparate im-
pact analysis to prove an individual claim brought under Title VII. Id. at 372-73. Her 
approach maintains the purity of the "same treatment" model but offers little real help 
to working women harmed by inadequate leave policies. Costly individual law suits in-
volving the inherent discovery and proof problems of disparate impact claims are hardly 
a practical solution for most workers disabled by pregnancy. 
66. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676. 
67. Id. at 685 n.26. 
68. See supra note 55 for the Ninth Circuit's explanation. 
69. As the Ninth Circuit aptly explained: 
Citing Newport News for the rule that employers may 
disregard a state statutory obligation to provide pregnancy 
disability leave stands that case on its head. Newport News 
extended a pregnancy benefit, while Cal Fed seeks to limit 
one. Newport News measured equivalence of benefits by the 
comprehensiveness of their coverage of the disabilities to 
which each sex is subject, while Cal Fed seeks to measure 
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Each side in the feminist controversy over whether the PDA 
allows a more favorable disability policy for pregnant workers 
points to the wording of the PDA for support.70 The court wisely 
distanced itself from the futile scrutiny of the language of the 
PDA and looked to the broad context of both the PDA and Title 
VII to determine the compatibility of section 12945(b)(2). 
The Ninth Circuit accurately distinguished pregnancy from 
impermissible stereotypical assumptions.71 Sensibly, the court 
then recognized that an interpretation of the PDA requiring to-
tal blindness to pregnancy was inconsistent with the PDA's own 
history,72 with Title VII, and with common knowledge.73 The 
PDA extended the safeguards of Title VII to pregnancy.74 Title 
equality of benefits by the sameness of coverage despite differ-
ences in need. 
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 393. 
70. One side claimed that the wording "same treatment" should be taken literally. 
See supra note 17 for the text of the PDA. The other claimed that defining discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex as including "on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth" entitled 
these conditions to the remedial treatment available to other Title VII-protected classifi-
cations when a disparate impact is shown. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
at 429-31 (1971) (eliminated test requirement applied to all employees but which was not 
related to job performance and acted to perpetuate discrimination); Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140-43 (1977) (neutral seniority plan unlawful because loss of senior-
ity by women on pregnancy leave imposed a substantial burden on women). A disparate 
impact justifies different treatment to prevent the unjust result. See United Steelworkers 
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Title VII does not prohibit affirmative action plans). 
However, if the PDA specifically forbids greater disability leaves for pregnancy than are 
available for other disabilities, this remedy is not available to prevent pregnancy discrim-
ination. See supra note 56 for further discussion of Griggs. 
Studying the language of the PDA to resolve the controversy is futile because the 
language is self-contradicting: the first clause seemingly giving pregnancy the same 
"privileges" as other protected classifications and the second clause seemingly restricting 
those "privileges" in the case of pregnancy. See supra note 48 for the Ninth Circuit's 
description of the ambiguity. 
71. It is significant that section 12945(b)(2) does not require maternity leaves for all 
pregnant workers. Doing so would impermissibly assume that all pregnant women need a 
long leave. This would distort the true biological difference, changing the distinction to 
an overbroad stereotyped assumption. Because the law only requires leaves when medi-
cally necessary, it is clear that only the biological difference is being addressed; the time 
is required for childbirth or medical complications, but not for providing child care-a 
role that can be undertaken by either sex. 
72. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
73. While some argue that pregnancy should be treated the same as any physical 
disability, it is common knowledge that pregnancy is different. If it must be distin-
guished more specifically, it is at least different in the large number of workers affected 
by it, see infra note 78, its status as a fundamental right, and in its likely "result," a new 
life. None of these distinctions is insignificant. 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). 
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VII provides protection from. the disparate impact on one sex of 
facially neutral employment policies.75 It would be inconsistent 
and illogical to deny disparate impact protection to pregnant 
women when it is available to other groups protected under Ti-
tle VII. In fact, to deny disparate impact protection to preg-
nancy would itself be discrimination against pregnancy. 
Notably absent from the Ninth Circuit's inquiry into 
whether the state law was permissible were public policy consid-
erations. States have a strong interest in preventing the termina-
tion of pregnant workers. Laws such as section 12945(b)(2) are 
especially important because of the likelihood that inadequate 
leave policies are most prevalent in the very kind of non-union-
ized positions traditionally held by women.76 With an increasing 
number of households supported solely or to a significant extent 
by women,77 many of whom are likely to get pregnant,78 the ter-
mination of pregnant workers can have a devastating financial 
effect on families79 and on state welfare program~. In addition to 
75. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 430 (1971). 
76. While the number of women in the labor force has increased in the last few 
years, four out of five of these new jobs have been in the service area. Most women work 
in low-paying jobs without opportunities for advancement, such as waitressing or food 
service, health care, clerical or child care work. San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 29, 1985, at 
H8, col. 1. 
77. Families headed by female householders with no spouse present: 1970, 10.8%; 
1980, 14.5~;'; 1983, 15.4%. USA Statistics in Brief, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, Supp. 1985. Married couple families with husband and wife employed: 1970, 
29.4~;'; 1980, 44.8%; 1984,48.7%. Id. at 399. Of married couple families with husband 
unemployed, the percent having only wife employed: 1970, 33.4%; 1980, 39.5%; 1984, 
41.7%. Id. The census bureau reported these additional findings for 1984: 28% of the 
births by 18 to 24 year olds were to unmarried women; of women past age 30 who gave 
birth, 52~;, were working or looking for work, up from 28% in 1976; women with no high 
school diploma had the highest birth rate at 81.9 per 1000; women with three years of 
college or more had the lowest rate with 54.8 per 1000; women with family incomes of 
less than $10,000 had a rate of 88.5 births per 1000; the rate dropped to 46 per 1000 for 
women in families with an income above $35,000 a year. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 4, 
1985, at 2, col. 5. 
78. "Eighty-five percent of working women are likely to become pregnant at least 
once during their working lives." Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, supra note 6, at 930 n.7 (citing S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. 
KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 25 (1983». 
79. In a study conducted for the congressional Joint Economic Committee, it was 
reported that "the share of national income going to families with children has dropped 
19 percent since 1973." San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 26, 1985, at 8, col. 1. The statistics 
indicated that families with single female heads had a mean income last year of $13,257, 
less than 40% of the $34,379 average income for two-parent families. Id. See supra note 
63 suggesting the possible impact of anti-abortion legislation. 
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self-reliant families, procreation is also an important govern-
ment interest.8o The value of children both to families who want 
them and to society should not be ignored. Pregnancy should be 
accommodated, not punished. 
V. CONCLUSION 
California Government Code section 12945 (b)(2) protects 
pregnant workers from possible termination as a result of disa-
bility leave policies that fail to take pregnancy into account. It 
mitigates the additional burden faced by female employees be-
cause of their unique biological role as childbearers. Title VII 
and the PDA were intended to further equality of the sexes in 
employment opportunity. The California law is consistent with 
that goal because removing a barrier that confronts only women 
does not create an injustice to men. An interpretation of the 
PDA that prohibits recognition of pregnancy as an inherent and 
exclusively female characteristic refutes common knowledge and 
perpetuates the use of a male normative standard in employ-
ment policies. It illogically forbids a specific state intervention to 
remedy pregnancy discrimination, while failure to take preg-
nancy into -account results in harm which states have an interest 
in preventing. The Ninth Circuit's rebuke of the preemption at-
tack on section 12945(b)(2) was a victory both for women's 
equality and for common sense. 
Susan Spalter Berman* 
80. A declining birthrate "could lead to a loss of 'national vigor' and declining pro· 
ductivity, according to experts who gathered recently at the Hoover Institute at Stanford 
University." San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 8, 1985, at E1, col. 1. 
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